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Abstract  
 
This dissertation was written as a part of the “MSc in Energy Law, Business, Regulation 
and Policy” at the International Hellenic University. Energy security is currently one of 
the most disputed issues between the European Union (EU) and Russian Federation 
(Russia). Their energy trading relationship can be characterized as a “necessary evil” for 
both. Neither, EU feels comfortable, being highly dependent on energy imports from third 
countries, let alone when it is Vladimir Putin's Russia, nor Russia feels comfortable, being 
highly dependent on the energy exports-revenues to the Pro-American EU. From EU’s 
perspective, having experienced the consequences of 2006 and 2009 gas crises, 
Russia’s position as a reliable partner-supplier is considered as questionable, leading 
the EU to accelerate its energy diversification and liberalization efforts to decrease its 
dependency on Russian hydrocarbons. On the other hand, from Russia’s perspective, 
the above EU attempts, along with the growing Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) market are 
considered as a threat for Russia’s domination over European energy market. 
This thesis aims apart from analysing the phenomenon of the interdependence between 
EU-Russia and its impact on the EU energy security, to propose a long-term EU energy 
strategy based on: (i) the diversification of the energy supply by exploiting “taboo” energy 
sources, such as shale fossil fuels and nuclear energy and (ii) the development of new 
interconnections linked with new LNG regasification facilities, especially in the littoral EU 
Member States located in the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Sea, in order to provide flexibility 
and liquidity regarding the energy supply of both littoral and landlocked Central, Eastern 
and Baltic Member States, decreasing their dependence on Russian hydrocarbons. The 
thesis concludes that there is a crucial need for a common EU energy policy, according 
to which, the EU would negotiate with one voice vis-à-vis third countries such as Russia. 
EU must undertake such a strategy not only because over-reliance on any one supplier-
source represents unsound policy, but more importantly because Europe’s dependency 
on Russian energy already profoundly threatens the sovereignty of certain Member 
states. On the other hand, Russia should carry out needed reforms internally and stop 
aggression outside its borders because its current energy foreign policy threatens its 
economy’s viability. 
 
Keywords: energy, geopolitics, interdependence, security, strategy 
 
Alexandros Dimitrios Nalmpantis 
Thessaloniki, 30.01.2017 
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1. Introduction  
This thesis focuses on the drafting and interpretation of the interdependence between 
European Union (EU) and Russian Federation (Russia) and how this interdependence 
impacts on EU energy security of supply. Reading the following analysis, someone could 
deeply understand how the conflicting geopolitical-economic interests of EU and Russia 
can affect their trading relationship regarding both the viability of their economies and 
their energy security, as they are of the strongest international actors defining the global 
economy’s trends and hence the life of each of us. Regarding, the study and analysis of 
the current topic, a bibliographic method-approach is adopted, based on the literature 
and the documentation of the validity of these sources with the contribution of reliable 
statistical graphs and tables. 
 
With regard to the structure of this thesis, Chapter 2 contains an analysis of the 
detrimental consequences in economic and social level that Russia experienced due to 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. This chapter serves to highlight the profound effect of 
Soviet Union’s dissolution on Russia’s foreign policy that persists until today, helping us 
to understand the vital importance of energy exports revenues both for the viability of 
Russian economy and its national security. Subsequently, Chapter 3 is divided into three 
sections. In the first one, there is a briefly presentation of the Russian energy sector 
based on variety of significant statistical data, to get familiar with Russia’s energy 
industry’s current situation and trends. The second section of this chapter presents the 
Russia’s coercive use of its energy resources as geopolitical weapon (“Pipeline Politics”) 
against neighbouring ex-Soviet states which consists a lasting threat for the EU’s security 
of supply. Finally, third section refers on the Russia’s answer to the current geo-political 
challenges (i.e. US LNG, EU supply diversification and liberalization efforts, tense 
diplomatic relations with transit states such as Ukraine) threatening Russia’s energy 
domination’s over European market). Subsequently, Chapter 4 focuses on the impact of 
Russian-Ukrainian crisis of 2014 on the definition of the EU energy security strategy, 
giving emphasis on the intended diversification efforts -on behalf of EU- regarding the 
energy transport routes, supplier-source countries and energy types. Last but not least, 
Chapter 5 proposes a long-term EU energy strategy based on: (i) the diversification of 
energy supply by exploiting “taboo” sources, such as shale fossil fuels and nuclear 
energy and (ii) the construction of new pipeline interconnectors and LNG regasification 
facilities. Finally, the thesis draw a conclusion, focusing on the crucial need for a unified 
EU energy policy, according to which, the EU would negotiate with one voice vis-à-vis 
third countries such as Russia. 
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2. Post-Soviet era shock & the vital importance of energy to the 
Russian economy  
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR) introduced one of the most important social-
political divisional section in the world history. It vanished the threat of nuclear war that 
had hung over the world during the “Cold War”, marking a new era in which capitalism 
prevailed in global consciousness as the sole viable economic system and the USA - as 
the main representative of capitalist ideals - emerged as the undisputed world-
superpower. At the same time, Russia suffered in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
USSR the severe economic turmoil during the transition from a centrally command 
economy to a free globally integrated market economy (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). 1 
 
.  
Source: GDP data retrieved from IMF (2015). World Economic Outlook Database and the other data retrieved from 
Gavrilenkov and Izryadnova (2003) 
 
 
Figure 1: Behaviour of Russian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the production of 
goods as % of total GDP: 1991-1999. 
 
 
Table 1: Variations in estimates of capital flight from Russia: 1991-1997 (in billion U$D) 
 
Variations in estimates 
of capital flight 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total 
Minimum 1.0 2.5 5.0 2.5 5.0 10.0 26 
Medium 8.2 13.0 8.0 17.0 12.0 12.0 70.2 
Maximum 15.5 20.0 17.0 42.4 30.0 24.0 148.9 
Source: Tikhomirov (2000) 
 
                                                             
1 President Yeltsin's program of radical - market-oriented reform known as a “shock therapy”, 
resulted in a major economic crisis, characterized by round 50 % decline in Russian GDP between 
1991-1996 due to both the significant reduction in industry output (see Figure 1) and the huge 
capital flight (see Table 1). 
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Source: Russia Federal Statistics Service (2015) 
 
Figure 2: Social indicators of the Post-Soviet Russia: 1992-2002. 
 
 
It should be stressed that the reference to the collapse of the USSR and its detrimental 
consequences in economic and social level that Russia experienced, serves to highlight 
the profound effect of them on Russia’s foreign policy that persists until today. The sense 
of “being vulnerable”, as a side effect of the socioeconomic shock caused by the collapse 
of the Soviet regime, continues until today to determine Russia’s national energy security 
strategy. Since USSR’s dissolution, energy resources became Russia’s key method for 
restoring its economy, military capabilities, and geopolitical status (Bugajski, 2004). 
 
At this point, it would be useful for the following analysis to define first the term of national 
security and then examine the Russian perception of its own national security. National 
security as a concept encloses the vital need to ensure the survival and prosperity of the 
state using economic-politic power, diplomacy, and power projection (Baldwin, 1997). 
Ensuring national security also implies both economic and energy security. In case of 
Russia, we notice that both the Russian political elite and the population2 felt insecure 
and isolated during the first decade after the collapse of the USSR. 
                                                             
2 Millions plunged into poverty, from a level of 1.5 % of total population in the late Soviet era to 
33,5 % by 1992 (see Figure 2) resulted in Russia’s official request to the United Nations for 
international humanitarian food aid (Milanovic, 1998). The period of 1990s was also marked by 
extreme corruption, the rise of criminal gangs (Siegel, 2004) and the considerable increases in 
the alcohol related deaths, suicides and homicides. (WHO, 2006 - see Figure 3). 
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Source: Russia Federal Statistics Service (2015) 
 
Figure 3: Alcohol poisonings, suicides and homicides in Post-Soviet Russia: 1992-2002 
 
It is important to understand that the crisis felt Russia during the first decade after 
USSR’s dissolution has also to do with remarkable historical events occurring during the 
same relative period, which dramatically increased the sense of national insecurity, 
defining both internal and external policy of Russia in the coming decades. To be more 
specific, the 1998 economic crisis and collapse of the Russian ruble, 3 the internal conflict 
in Chechnya,4 and the expansive military presence of Russia’s former military rival (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the Balkan region5 contributed to feel the 
Russians economically and militarily threatened both from abroad and internally. 
Regarding the most important reason for the economic insecurity deriving from the 
Russian economic crisis in 1998, we should focus on the reducing demand and thus 
price of the exported crude oil and nonferrous metals, resulting from the Asian economic 
crisis began in 1997, which severely impacted Russian foreign exchange reserves6 
(Gaidar, 2004). The decline in Russian crude oil exports revenues alone from 1997 (21,1 
U$D billion) to 1998(14 U$D billion) was nearly 66 % (see Figure 4). 
                                                             
3 Declining productivity, a high fixed exchange rate between the ruble and foreign currencies and 
a chronic fiscal deficit were the reasons that led to the crisis (Chiodo and Owyang, 1998). 
4 From the time, Chechen separatists declared independence in the early 1990s, an intermittent 
guerrilla war has been fought between the rebel groups and the Russian military (Curtis, 1996).  
5 On 24 March 1999, despite Russian opposition to Western involvement in Kosovo, NATO began 
its bombing campaign in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Roberts, 1999). 
6 The Central Bank of Russia was forced to defend the ruble, spending 6 U$D billion of their 
foreign exchange reserves. At the same time as the ruble was under attack, the price of oil and 
non-ferrous metals began to drop, reducing Russia's hard-currency earnings by two-thirds 
(Chiodo and Owyang,1998).  
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Sources: Russian crude oil and refinery oil products revenues data retrieved from Kang and Park (2015) and crude oil 
prices data retrieved from: http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=crude-oil&months=300 
 
Figure 4: Behaviour of crude oil price and the Russian crude oil and refinery oil 
products exports revenues: 1997-2011. 
 
The economic situation in Russia began to improve by the end of 1999 with the gradual 
increase in demand for Russian oil and gas exports. According to Sabitova and 
Shavaleyeva (2015), during 2000-2008 period, the GDP increased round 1.7 times, while 
average export oil prices 3.2 times and the average gas prices 4.3 times. The Russian 
economy, which had averaged 7 % growth during 1998-2008 as oil prices rose rapidly, 
has seen diminishing growth rates since then due to the exhaustion of Russia’s 
commodity-based growth model. In the course of crisis 2009, both the average export oil 
prices and the average gas prices dropped 1.6 times while the GDP decreased by 7.8 
%. The behaviour of Russian GDP and the average export prices for oil and gas is 
presented below (see Figure 5). 
 
 
Source: Sabitova and Shavaleyeva (2015) 
 
Figure 5: Behaviour of Russian GDP and the average export gas and crude oil prices: 
2000-2014. 
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After a brief period (2010-2012, see Figure 5), when oil and gas average prices increased 
round 1,8 times since 2008 crisis, the oil and gas prices7 began falling again. The drop 
in oil prices was caused by a drop in the demand for oil across the world, as well as 
increased oil production in the United States (Mooney, 2014). Thanks to the booming 
shale oil revolution taking place in states like North Dakota and Texas, oil production in 
the USA has increased for the period 2009-2015 by 37,5 % (see Figure 6). 
 
The fall of Russian ruble beginning in the second half of 2014, caused by a combination 
of falling oil prices (from U$D 111,87 per barrel in June 2014 to U$D 62,16 per barrel in 
December 2014, declined nearly 55 % - EIA, 2015), economy’s structural limitations and 
international sanctions following Russia's annexation of Crimea, resulted in pushing 
Russian economy into a deep recession in 2015, with the GDP falling by close to 4 % 
driving a 9.5 % decline in real wages (Luhn, 2016). The economic recession has led 2.3 
million Russians fell into poverty in the first nine months of 2015. (Moscow Times, 2015). 
As a result, Russians’ despair has grown. Even a rising number of small, local protests 
have occurred (Friedman, 2016). 
 
 
Source: US Energy Information Administration (2016) 
 
Figure 6: U.S. field production of crude oil: 2000-2015. 
 
The fall in oil prices hit Russia hard, as roughly half of the Russia's governmental revenue 
in 2014 comes from the sale of oil and gas (Chung, 2014). Russia's economy suffers 
from “Dutch disease”, a term economists use to describe a situation in which a country 
                                                             
7 Although once seen as the fair and secure way to value natural gas, oil-indexation has been 
losing ground as the dominant pricing method in Europe since 2014 (Theisen, 2014). Most 
recently, even Russia's Gazprom, the foremost advocate of oil-pegged gas prices, has yielded to 
pressure and decided to increase the share of spot pricing in its export portfolio (Reuters, 2015). 
We can notice that in every country that switched away from oil-indexation to a hub-spot pricing 
model, the price of gas for the end-consumer declined significantly (De Meulemeester, 2015). 
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focuses on developing its natural resources to the detriment of other economic activity 
(Coppola, 2014). The Kremlin - having learned a painful lesson in 2015 in a vain effort to 
determine its budget based on optimistic forecasts regarding the oil prices - is trying now 
to diversify the economy away from extractive-energy industries, becoming less 
dependent on energy export revenues, which now accounts for 37 % of all government 
revenues, compared to roughly 50 % in 2014 (Kottasova, 2016).The behaviour analysis 
of GDP and oil and gas revenues of Russia budget system suggests that their trends 
repeat in general (Table 2 and Figure 7).  
 
 
Table 2: Russian oil and gas revenues in 2004-2014. 
 
   Oil and gas 
Year Consolidated 
Revenues (bnR) 
Federal 
Revenues (bnR) 
Revenues 
(bnR) 
Share of consolidated 
revenues (bnR) 
Share of federal 
revenues (bnR) 
2004 5429.89 3428.87 1035.11 19.06 30.19 
2005 8127.09 5127.23 2162.01 26.60 42.17 
2006 10076.22 6278.89 2943.54 29.21 46.88 
2007 12609.58 7781.12 2897.37 22.98 37.24 
2008 15474.71 9275.93 4389.43 28.37 47.32 
2009 13264.37 7337.75 2983.96 22.50 40.67 
2010 14842.76 8305.41 3830.67 25.81 46.12 
2011 19011.89 11367.65 5641.77 29.67 49.63 
2012 20920.06 12855.54 6453.18 30.85 50.20 
2013 21186.06 13019.94 6534.04 30.84 50.18 
2014 23402.09 14496.83 7433.81 31.77 51.28 
Source: Sabitova–Shavaleyeva (2015). Abbreviation: bnR= billion Rubles 
  
Source: Sabitova and Shavaleyeva (2015) 
Figure 7: Behaviour of Russian nominal GDP and oil and gas revenues: 2004-2014. 
 
Having briefly highlighted the historical reasons for the economic-social insecurity 
experienced by Russia after the collapse of the Soviet regime and having analysed-
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understood the vital importance of Russian energy export revenues for the viability of 
Russian economy and thus for its national security, we can examine later the relationship 
of energy interdependence between Russia and the EU and its influence upon the 
energy-economic security of both.  
 
 
3. The strategic role of energy for the Kremlin’s foreign energy 
policy 
 
Formation of long-term energy policy began with the first step of Russia as an 
independent state. But in my opinion, we should focus on Vladimir Putin’s presidency 
following his suspicious8 and unexpected9 rise to power in 1999, examining the 
phenomenon of “Putinism”10 as a reference point in the definition and evolution of the 
Russian energy strategy as we know so far.11 In his thesis, Putin discussed the 
importance of Russia’s natural resource wealth in Russia’s energy policy. He outlined 
his view of the appropriate role of the Russian state, and of vertically integrated financial 
- industrial groups, particularly in the oil and gas industry (Balzer, 2005). As president, 
Putin put into action the basic principles outlined in his thesis, effectively nationalizing 
the oil and gas industry in order both to ensure that the profits from energy exports would 
be used in favour of weak Russian economy. With the gradual increase in demand for 
Russian crude oil and the recovery of oil prices throughout 1999, Russian economy 
began to improve, giving the possibility to Putin to make his dream real by restoring 
gradually Russia’s status as world-superpower. The improvement of the Russian 
economy thanks to the recovery of the Russian energy sector strengthened Putin’s 
political power - “popularity”, showing him as the undisputed guarantor of the security 
                                                             
8 During September 1999, there were a series of explosions that hit four apartment blocks in the 
Russian cities of Buynaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk, killing 293 and injuring more than 1000 
people. There are allegations that the bombings were a "false flag" attack perpetrated by the 
Federal Security Service of Russia - known as FSB - to legitimize the resumption of military 
activities in Chechnya and bring Vladimir Putin to the presidency by contributing to the increase 
of his popularity among the feared population (Judah, 2013).  
9On 31th of December 1999, Putin became acting President of the Russia upon the sudden 
resignation of President Yeltsin. It is claimed that when Yeltsin realized that if the opposition 
comes to power, it will be at high risk of prosecution chose Putin as his successor provided that 
the latter would guarantee for him immunity from prosecution (Judah, 2013). 
10 The ideology, priorities, and policies of Vladimir Putin are sometimes referred to as “Putinism”. 
11 “Energy Strategy of the Russia until 2020”-approved in 2003, updated in 2009 and prolonged 
for the period up to 2030, rightly stated that the energy sector “has a determining influence on the 
state and prospect of development of the national economy” (Ministry of Energy of the Russian 
Federation,2010). 
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and cohesion of a vast newly-wounded state, characterized by profound social 
inequalities and cultural-ethnic differences within. 
 
3.1. Presenting Russian energy sector’s situation & trends 
 
Energy proved reserves: Russia possesses the first place (17.3 % - see Table 3) 
regarding the share of world total proved gas reservoirs. The majority of those reserves 
are located in West Siberia (EIA, 2016). 12 In terms of coal, Russia (17.6 %) comes 
second after the USA, which holds nearly a third (26.6 %) of the earth’s coal reservoirs 
(see Table 3). On the other hand, Russia possesses ‘only’ 6 % (see Table 3) of the 
planet’s oil reservoirs, i.e. the oil reserves of Middle East are almost 8-fold that of Russia 
(47.3 %) and they are feasibly accessible unlike the remote fields in vast Russia (BP, 
2016). Most of Russia’s proved oil reserves are located in West-Siberia, between the 
Ural Mountains and the central Siberian Plateau, and in the Urals-Volga region extending 
into the Caspian Sea. In the longer term, reserves located in East Siberia, Russian Far 
East (Sakhalin Island) along with the largely unexploited reserves in Russian Artic will 
significantly increase the total Russian oil output (EIA, 2016). 
 
Table 3: Russia’s energy sector’s general overview 2016. 
 
 Proved Reserves Production Consumption Export 
potential 
 
Prime natural 
resources Deposits 
World 
total % Quantities 
World 
total % Quantities 
World 
total % 
Gas 32.3 tcm 17.3 573.3 bcm 16.1 391.5 bcm 11.3 181.8 bcm 
Oil 14.0 tmt 6.0 540.7 mt 12.4 143.0 mt 3.3 397.7 mt 
Coal 157010 mt 17.6 184.5 mtoe 4.8 88.7 mtoe 2.3 95.8 mtoe 
Source: BP statistical review of world energy (2016). Abbreviations: tcm = trillion cubic metres; bcm = billion cubic metres; 
tmt = thousand million tons; mt = million tons; mtoe=million tons of equivalent 
 
Energy production: In 2008, Russia was the world’s largest gas supplier (19.6 %), the 
second largest oil (12.1 %) producer after Saudi Arabia (13.1 %) and the 6th largest coal 
producer (4.6 %) (BP, 2009). Back in 2008, Vladimir Putin looked close to realizing his 
vision of turning Russia into an energy superpower. Gazprom had become the world’s 
third company regarding its market value13 and European dependence of Russian 
energy supplies looked set to grow14. 
 
                                                             
12 The estimate does not take into account the unconventional gas reserves. Currently, no 
detailed-accurate picture on the unconventional gas reserves can be drawn. 
13 At the end of 2008 Gazprom’s market capitalization was U$D 306.79 billion (Gazprom, 2008). 
14 Russian gas exports covered about 58 % of European gas demand (EIA International Energy 
Statistics Database). 
10 
 
A combination of the 2008 global financial crisis, Russia’s energy disputes with Ukraine, 
shifts in EU policy and changes in the international gas market have triggered 
developments that are changing the dynamic of energy relations in Europe. Moreover, 
the EU attempts aiming at the creation of a single liberalized European energy market 
(3rd EU Energy Package), the European Commission’s competition inquiry into Gazprom, 
the emerging shale gas revolution and the growth of LNG mean that a combination of 
widening supply options now pose a serious challenge to Russia’s energy dominance. 
European governments are actively developing alternatives to Russian gas supplies and 
prices. The volumes of Russian exports to Europe have declined by 5 % since 2008 (see 
Table 4), and Gazprom has suffered a-seven-fold- reduction of its market value in 
relation to the equivalent of 2007 (see Figure 8). 
 
Table 4: Gazprom’s gas sales to Europe-including Turkey (2008-2016). 
 
 
Source: Gazprom (2016) 
 
Figure 8: Gazprom’s capitalization. 
 
Since 2015, Russia has dropped in second place (16.1 %) in total world production of 
dry gas as it was overtaken by USA (22 %) due to the US Shale gas boom, is the world 
largest producer of crude oil- including lease condensate - and the third (12.4 %) largest 
Year Price (U$D /m3) Volume (m3) Revenues (U$D/b) 
2008 256 167.6 68.8 
2009 238.6 152.8 38.4 
2010 302 138.6 41.9 
2011 383 150 57.5 
2012 402 138.8 55.8 
2013 385 161.5 62.2 
2014 349 146.6 51.2 
2015 238 160 38 
2016 200 160 32 
Sources: data for years 2008 and 2009 retrieved from “Gazprom in figures 2008-2012” and data 
for years 2010-2016 retrieved from Mazneva (2015). Abbreviations: U$D/m3= United States 
Dollars/ cubic meter; m3=cubic meter; U$D/b= United States Dollars/ barrel 
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producer in petroleum and other liquids after Saudi Arabia and USA (both 13 %) and is 
still in 6th (4.8 %) place of world coal producers (BP, 2016). 
Energy Primary Consumption: Russia consumed during 2015, 523.8 mtoe (gas, coal, 
nuclear energy, hydro-electricity and RES) and 143 mto (BP, 2016 - see Figure 9). 
Source: BP statistical review of world energy (2016) 
 
Figure 9: Russia’s primary energy consumption by fuel: 2015. 
 
 
Energy export potential: Russia’s current export potential of various energy forms is 
significant. According to BP (2016), Russia is presently able to export over 181.8 bcm of 
gas, some 397.7 mto, and over 95.8 mtoe of coal. 
 
3.1.1. Russia’s oil sector  
 
Sector’s Organization: Following the collapse of the Soviet regime, Russia initially 
privatized its oil industry, but since Putin era, the oil and gas sector have gradually 
reverted to state’s control to support both domestic and foreign policies-goals of Putin 
regime. Five firms, namely Rozneft, Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz, Gazprom and Trasneft, 
including their shares of joint venture production, contribute in more than 75 % of Russian 
total oil production, while the Russian state directly controls more than 50 % of total oil 
production (EIA, 2016). 
 
Oil exports: In 2015, most Russian crude oil exports (62 %) and oil products (52 %) were 
delivered to European countries. (Table 5 and 6) Additionally, revenues from crude oil 
and products exports in 2015 accounted for 46 % of Russia’s total export revenues (UN 
Comtrade Database, 2015). While Russia is dependent on European consumption, EU 
is similarly dependent on Russian oil supply, with almost 30 % of EU crude oil imports in 
2015 coming from Russia (European Commission, 2016a).  
Natural Gas
53%
Oil
22%
Coal
13%
Nuclear-Ηydro-
Renewables
12%
Natural Gas Oil Coal Nuclear-Ηydro-Renewables
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Table 5: Russia’s crude oil exports by destination, 2015. 
 
Region Crude Oil/mt % of total Russian crude oil 
t  China Republic 42.41 16.6 
Europe 158.5 62 
Japan 14.2 5.6 
Other Asia/Pacific 11.2 4,4 
Other CIS 23.2 9 
USA, South &Central Amerika 2.3 0.8 
Source: BP statistical review of world energy (2016). Abbreviation: mt=million tons 
  
 
Table 6: Russia’s oil product exports by destination, 2015. 
 
Region Oil Products/mt % of total Russian oil product 
t  Africa 0.9 0.6 
China Republic 3.8 2.5 
Europe 88.9 52.2 
Japan 1.9 1.3 
Other Asia/Pacific 8.7 5.8 
Other CIS 23.2 15.4 
North America 15.8 10.5 
South & Central Amerika 1 0.7 
Source: BP statistical review of world energy (2016). Abbreviation: mt=million tons 
  
Pipeline network: Russia has an extensive domestic distribution and export pipeline 
network, which is nearly completed owned and run by the state-owned Transneft (for 
more details see Table A1 in the Appendix). 
 
3.1.2. Russia’s gas sector 
 
Sector’s organization: The state-run Gazprom dominates Russia’s upstream gas sector, 
owning the world largest gas transmission system with a total length of 106.378 thousand 
miles (Gazprom, 2016). The company’s share in global and Russian gas proved reserves 
amount, to 17 and 72 % respectively (Gazprom, 2016). Russia has also numerous 
independent producers who now control 38 % of gas resources, but at this stage account 
for only 16% of production (Romanova, 2016). 
 
Gas exports: In 2015, almost 159.8 bcm of Russia’s gas exports were delivered in 
Europe via pipelines. Germany, Italy, Turkey and Belarus absorbed the largest volume 
(70 %) of those exports (see Table 7). At this point, it should be noted that the Ukrainian 
imports of Russian gas declined in 2015 by 28 % (7 bcm) in relation to 2013 (25.1 bcm) 
due to both often gas price-payments disputes between Ukraine and Russia and 
Russia’s military and political involvement in 2014 Crimean Crisis, which affected their 
diplomatic relations. The above strained relations resulted in a remarkable decline of 
Ukrainian dependency on Russian gas from 93 % of total Ukrainian gas imports in 2013 
(BP, 2014) to 43 % in 2015 (BP, 2016). In 2015, revenues from gas imports accounted 
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for about 13 % of total Russian export revenues, showing that Russia is significantly 
dependent on the European energy market. Additionally, European countries is also 
dependent on Russian gas supply in varying degrees (see Table 7). Some of them, 
namely Belarus, Finland and Hungary, Baltics and most of Southeast European 
Countries cover almost all of their gas needs from Russian imports, being vulnerable to 
the Russia’s political-economic leverage. On the other hand, Russia exported in 2015, 
14.5 bcm in the form of LNG to Asia. More than 70 % of the above volumes were 
absorbed by Japan (see Table 8). Since mid-2000s, Russia has started to draw up a 
new energy strategy (“Putin's strategic shift eastwards”) for expansion of gas exports in 
the form of LNG, focusing on intensive Asian market to diversify its gas export portfolio. 
The western sanctions, implemented in 2014 to Russia, in response to the military and 
political intervention of the latter in the internal affairs of Ukraine (Crimean Crisis), led 
Russia via Gazprom in May 2014 to sign with the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) a 30-year deal to deliver 38 bcm to China annually via the eastern route (“Power 
of Siberia” project) and 30 bcm via western route (“Power of Siberia–2”). However, it is 
now generally accepted that the announced volumes will be lower (Reuters, 2016a). 
 
Table 7: Russia’s gas exports via pipeline by destination, 2015. 
 
Country Gas volumes / bcm 
% of total Russian 
gas exports 
% dependency on 
Russian gas 
Austria 4.3 2.7 71.6 
Belarus 16.8 10.5 100 
Belgium 10.9 6.8 46 
Czech Republic 4.1 2.5 53.2 
Finland 2.7 1.7 100 
France 9.5 6 26.4 
Germany 45.2 28.2 43.4 
Greece 1.9 1.2 76 
Hungary 5.8 3.6 100 
Italy 24 15 47.8 
Kazakhstan 5.0 3.1 63.3 
Netherlands 2.3 1.4 7.6 
Poland 8.8 5.5 79.2 
Other CIS 4.4 2.8 86.3 
Other Europe 9.8 6.1 48 
Slovakia 3.7 2.3 28.6 
Turkey 26.6 16.6 67 
Ukraine 7 4.4 43.2 
Source: BP statistical review of world energy (2016), Abbreviation: bcm=billion cubic metres 
 
 
Table 8: Russia’s LNG exports by destination, 2015. 
 
Country Gas volumes / bcm % of total Russian LNG exports 
China Republic 0.2 1,4 
Japan 10.5 72.4 
South Korea 3.5 24.1 
Taiwan 0.3 2 
Source: BP statistical review of world energy (2016) Abbreviation: bcm=billion cubic metres 
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Pipeline network: Russia’s gas transmission network includes round 100.000 miles of 
high-pressure pipelines and 22 underground gas storages (UGS) facilities, run-operated 
by Gazprom (Gazprom, 2016). Since the late 2000s, Gazprom has been constructing-
planning major new pipelines to accommodate new sources of supply, including fields in 
Yamal and Eastern Siberia, and new export routes, including exports to China (“Power 
of Siberia”) and new pipelines to northern Europe bypassing Ukraine, such as “Nord 
Stream” I and II (for more details see Table A2 in the Appendix). 
 
LNG projects: Russia has a single operating LNG export facility, namely “Sakhalin LNG”. 
The majority of the “Sakhalin’s LNG” volumes has been contracted to Japanese and 
South Korean buyers under long-term supply contracts (see Table 8). There are number 
of proposals in various stages of planning for new LNG terminals in Russia since 2013 
(see Table 9). By this year, Russia modified its Law on Gas Exports, breaking Gazprom’s 
monopoly on all gas exports (EIA, 2016). 
 
Table 9: Russia’s LNG projects. 
 
Facility 
(Liquefaction Projects) Status 
Capacity 
(mt/ year) 
Announced 
start year Area 
Sakhalin Operating 10+ 2009 Pacific coast 
Sakhalin (expansion) Planning 5 post 2020 Pacific coast 
Yamal Under Constr. 16.5 2017 Artic coast 
Artic Planning 16.5+ by 2025 Artic coast 
Baltic Planning 10 post 2021 Baltic coast 
Far East Planning 5 post 2020 Pacific coast 
Vladivostok Planning 15 post 2018 Pacific coast 
Pechora Delayed 8+ ? Artic coast 
Shtokman Delayed 30 ? Artic coast 
Regasification Project     
Kaliningrad  Planning 2.4 post 2017 Baltic coast 
Source: US Energy Information Administration (2016). Abbreviation: mt=million tons 
 
 
 
3.2. Kremlin’s “Pipeline Politics” against the ex-Soviet countries’ sovereignty 
 
Once assumed the presidency, Putin made clear his intention to exploit Russian energy 
export power as a weapon to regain Soviet Union’s Cold War influence around the world, 
and particularly in Central, Eastern Europe and the Caucuses. Leonard and Popescu 
(2007) describe Russian foreign policy arsenal by dividing the actions into hard power 
and soft power categories. They categorize oil and gas embargoes, energy 
infrastructures takeovers and different energy pricing as hard power actions (see Table 
10). 
  
15 
 
Table 10: Russia’s foreign policy arsenal. 
 
Hard Power Soft Power 
Blockades of trading goods Russian mass-media (propaganda) 
Oil & gas embargoes Financing NGOs 
Transports & communications blockades Economic growth 
Different energy prices Visa free regime 
Infrastructures takeovers Military training 
Secessionist conflicts Authoritarian capitalism 
Non-withdrawal of troops Support-Protection of authoritarian regimes 
Arms at discount prices for allies Exporting ‘sovereign democracy’ 
Source: Liuhto (2010) based on Leonard and Popescu (2007) 
 
 
Robert Larsson (2006) also stresses: “Utilising energy policy as a political or economic 
lever can be accomplished in several ways. A few energy tools of special importance 
were identified during the research process, namely: a) supply interruptions (total or 
partial) threats of supply interruptions (covertly or explicit), b) pricing policy (prices as 
carrots or sticks) c) usage of existing energy debts, d) creating new energy debts, e) 
hostile take-overs of companies and infrastructures”. 
 
There are many political analysts as well as internal and external political opponents of 
Putin’s presidency who assert that Russia is using coercively its energy sources as 
political-economic leverage in Europe to foment new democracies that used to be part 
of the former Soviet Union. Kremlin behaves in former Soviet states, as buffer states, 
often interfering directly or indirectly in their internal political affairs (from 2004 Ukrainian 
presidential election led to “Orange Revolution”15 to 2013 Ukrainian crisis16 led to the 
annexation of Crimea by Russia on 18 March 2014)17. It is common practice for the 
                                                             
15 In the aftermath of the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election between leading candidates pro-
Western Viktor Yushchenko and pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych, there was a widespread public 
perception based on reports of both domestic and foreign election monitors that the results of the 
run-off vote were rigged by the authorities in favor of the latter. The above perception led to series 
of acts of civil disobedience organized by Yushchenko’s political movement, known as “Orange 
revolution” due to the color of his political campaign. “Orange revolution” succeeded when the 
results of the original run-off were annulled and a revote was ordered by Ukraine's Supreme 
Court. The results of second run-off showed a clear victory for Yushchenko, who received about 
52 % of the vote (Copsey, 2005). It should be noted that during his election campaign, 
Yushschenko suffered an assassination attempt, being poisoned by TCCD dioxin. It is rumored 
that behind this gruesome attempt was FSB (Van Voren, 2015). Poisoning political enemies in 
Eastern Europe and particularly in imperial Russia was considered as common practice, which it 
seems that is adopted till nowadays (Gedmin, 2015). 
16. Ukraine was suffered unrest, when pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign 
an association agreement with the EU. A political movement known as "Euromaidan" demanded 
closer ties with the EU and the resignation of Yanukovych. This move was ultimately successful, 
leading to the revolution of February 2014, which deposed the Yanukovych’s government. 
Following his ousting, riots unfolded in Russophone eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, 
where it drew most of its support (Morelli, 2017). 
17 The Kremlin depict the annexation of Crimea as an act of defending ethnic Russians, and the 
current conflict in Eastern Ukraine -as a Ukrainian civil war. Russian expansionism has always 
been veiled by the rhetoric of concern about “Russian compatriots” in neighboring countries 
(Ambrosio, 2016). 
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Kremlin, its attempt to manipulate election results in former Soviet states, bringing to 
power a pro-Russian government that is willing to serve the Russian political agenda-
interests to ensure the preservation of those states under Russian sphere of influence. 
The “colour revolutions” in Georgia (“Rose Revolution”)18 and Ukraine (“Orange 
Revolution”) that brought to power pro-Western governments in 2003-2004 was a sign 
that these countries were willing to leave the Russian sphere of influence choosing liberal 
democracy over economic mismanagement, electoral fraud, political corruption and 
poverty. Putin perceived these revolutions as a direct threat to his rule. A potential 
successfully modernization-democratization of post-Soviet countries such as Georgia 
and Ukraine would dramatically undermine his authoritarian regime. Hence, Putin’s 
“secret” agenda seeks to foment pro-Western governments in the neighbouring 
countries, by either using coercively energy resources or exploiting ethnic divisions (see 
Table 11) by supporting military and diplomatic separatist movements within them 
(Crimea and South Ossetia).The most important thing for him is to prevent former Soviet 
countries from joining NATO,19 which has nothing to do with national security of Russia 
- as the Kremlin officially supports -, but to the fear of the latter that may not be able to 
pursue its expansionist agenda. To understand better how Putin (not known for his tact) 
respects the sovereignty of the neighbouring former Soviet states, we should focus on a 
statement of him on Ukraine made at the Bucharest NATO meeting in 2008. Putin 
speaking to US President George Bush Junior, said: “You don’t understand, George that 
Ukraine is not even a state. What is Ukraine? Part of its territories is Eastern Europe, but 
the greater part is a gift from us” (Times, 2009). 
  
                                                             
18 The “Rose Revolution” resulted in a pro-Western change of power in Georgia in 2003. Following 
this, Georgia pursued a pro-Western foreign policy, declaring European and NATO integration as 
its main priority. This historical change contributed to Georgia's tensions with Russia, which 
continue to this day (Welt, 2005). 
19 Georgia’s public opinion and ruling government favor NATO membership, but it seems unlikely 
for Georgia joining NATO due to worries about Russian retaliation (Kavadze, 2014). Regarding 
Ukraine, due to the above worries, after the 2010 electoral victory of pro-Russian Viktor 
Yanukovych, the government officially declared neutrality and no longer seeks NATO 
membership, as it did after the “Orange Revolution” and the presidency of pro-Western Viktor 
Yushchenko (Besemeres, 2016). 
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Table 11: Russia’s potential leverage in the ex-USSR. 
 
Country Population (million) 
Share of ethnically-
Russians (%) Ethnically-Russians 
Ranking of ethnic 
groups 
Armenia 3.0 0.5 15.256 3rd 
Azerbaijan 9.8 1.3 127.400 3rd 
Belarus 9.5 8.3 788.500 2nd 
Estonia 1.2 24.8 297.600 2nd 
Georgia 4.9 1.5 73.500 4th 
Kazakhstan 18.3 23.7 4.337.100 2nd 
Kyrgyzstan 5.7 12.5 712.500 3rd 
Latvia 1.9 26.2 497.800 2nd 
Lithuania 2.8 5.8 162.400 3rd 
Moldova 3.5 5.9 206.500 3rd 
Tajikistan 8.3 1.1 91.300 3rd 
Turkmenistan 5.3 4 212.000 3rd 
Ukraine 44.2 17.3 7.646.600 2nd 
Uzbekistan 29.4 5.5 1.617.000 2nd 
Source: CIA World Factbook (2016) 
 
For many newly integrated EU Member States such as Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and for 
new democracies, like Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, Russian energy control is 
considered as an old but still relevant “nightmare” both for the viability of their economy 
and thus for the stability-sovereignty of their state. According to Hedenskog and Larsson 
(2007), some 70 % of Russia’s coercive energy actions against the ex-Soviet states were 
energy supply interruptions (total or partial) during 1991-2006. Over 40 % of those 
actions were targeted against the Baltic States. Another 40 % of the coercive measures 
were targeted against Georgia and Belarus (Liuhto, 2010).  
Russia’s coercive use of “Pipeline politics” began in early 1990s, when Russia cut-off 
energy supplies to the Baltic States to suppress vainly their independence movement 
(Smith, 2008). The energy weapon was used against the Baltic States again in 1992, in 
retaliation for Baltic States’ demands, according to which Russia had to remove its 
remaining military forces from the region. Additionally, in 1993 and 1994, Russia reduced 
gas supplies to Ukraine, in part, to force Kiev to pay its gas debt (economic dimension), 
but also to press Ukraine into ceding more control to Russia over the Black Sea Fleet 
(geopolitical dimension) (Smith, 2008). Moreover, from 1998 to 2000, in an attempt to 
stop the privatization20 of Lithuania’s “Mazeikiai” refinery (the only oil refinery in Baltic 
States) through a direct sale by the US firm “Williams International, Inc.” (“Williams”), 
“Transneft”, Russia’s monopoly transporter of piped oil, stopped the flow of crude oil to 
Lithuania nine times (Smith, 2008). Later, “Williams” ran into financial trouble, and their 
stake in “Mazeikiai” refinery was bought by the Russian company, “Yukos”. However, in 
2003, “Yukos” facing bankruptcy, began to sell off its assets, including “Mazeikiai” 
refinery. Several potential buyers from Russia, Kazakhstan and Poland showed interest 
                                                             
20 The privatization was not an open tender because Lithuanian politicians feared that Russian oil 
companies might gain a stake in the company. The negotiation terms were kept secret and 
therefore contributed to the popular resistance by Lithuanian citizens and the press to privatization 
by “Williams” (Sabaliauskaite, 2000). 
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in acquiring the refinery. After several months of talks, the proposal from Polish company 
“PKN Orlen” was chosen. Additionally, it was deemed most desirable by Lithuania, which 
has been aiming to avoid the refinery being bought out by Russian interests (Cienski, 
2006). To force Lithuania to reconsider the sale to of “Yukos”, Russia, citing 
environmental risk of leak, shut down the only onshore pipeline supplying Lithuania with 
crude oil. This action was described as "tools for intimidation and blackmail" by the US 
vice-president, Dick Cheney (Kramer, 2006). The coercive use of pipelines on behalf of 
Russia against the Baltic States has not received attention in the West -even though 
Lithuania is a EU and NATO Member State- till Gazprom’s supply disruptions of gas and 
oil to Central Europe in 2006-2007 which forced US and EU to raise awareness, while 
both have too long ignored the Russian’s non-transparent and monopolistic energy 
policies (Smith, 2008).The reliability of Russian gas was again questioned in 2009 due 
to a pricing dispute between Russia and Ukraine which caused flow disruptions, leading 
concomitantly to freezing conditions in Slovakia and Bulgaria in early January 2009.This 
was attributed to an attempt by Russia to interfere in the internal politics of Ukraine 
(Kovacevic, 2009).  
 
At this point, it should be noted that some Russian economists, such as former Kremlin 
economic adviser, Andrei Illarionov,21 and former deputy energy minister, Vladimir 
Milov,22 have openly criticized their country’s use of energy supplies as a geopolitical 
weapon to compete with other powerful geopolitical actors such as the USA and China. 
They argue that it will distort Russia’s own energy system and benefit those in power 
(Putin and Russian oligarchs), rather than Russia and its people’s prospect at large. 
 
On the other hand, there are some analysts, such as Dr. Trenin (2008) and Professor 
Goldthau (2008) who neither believe in Russia becoming an energy superpower nor 
consider that the latter is using its energy power as a geopolitical weapon. Both assert 
that Russian energy strategy is more about increasing state profits by strengthening 
                                                             
21Illarianov openly criticized the fact that the gas price was used as a political weapon against 
Ukraine. He claimed Putin had asked him help spin the price hike, but that he resigned because 
this move “had no relation not only with liberal economic policy, but to economic policy at all”. He 
complained to Ekho Moskvy Radio on 31th December 2005 that “Energy weapons are used 
against neighbors” (Blagov, 2006). 
22In 2006, Milov stated as follows: “The energy superpower concept is an illusion with no basis in 
reality. Perhaps most dangerously, it doesn’t recognize the mutual dependence between Russia 
and energy consumers. Because of political conflicts and declining production, future supply 
disruptions to Europe are likely. There will come a day when European gas companies demand 
elimination of the take-or-pay conditions in their Russian contracts. This will threaten Gazprom’s 
ability to borrow. Putin’s attempt to use energy to increase Russian influence could backfire in the 
long run” (Liuhto, 2010). 
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Russian state-controlled companies’ position in the international energy markets than 
serving the establishment of geopolitical domination. To be more specific Trenin stresses 
that: “energy is a political business, but it is business first and last”, while Goldthau 
argues that: “the rationale behind Russia’s recent ‘gas disputes’ with its neighbours is to 
a large extent profit maximization, rather than punishing renegade governments in the 
neighbouring Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS)”23 (Liuhto, 2010). 
 
3.3. Kremlin’s answer to geo-political challenges threatening its energy 
domination 
 
Putin is aware of the challenges facing the Russian energy industry. To be more specific, 
the 2014 sanctions - affecting external finance and access to oil technologies - along 
with the low oil price and the slowdown both in the global and Russian economy, have 
“cornered” Kremlin. Moreover, due to the LNG sector’s growth and concomitantly the 
development of new LNG import facilities, countries such as Lithuania and Poland, have 
the ability to import gas from suppliers around the globe (i.e. US, Norwegian or Qatari 
LNG) bypassing Russia's traditional lever.24 Additionally, a set of EU energy 
diversification and liberalization efforts (i.e. “3rd EU Energy Package”) have contributed 
in giving EU Member States the political and legal tools to mitigate Russia’s dominance 
in their respective gas supply, challenging its monopolistic business practices. On the 
other hand, Russia's attempts in the past decade to diversify its economy's structure by 
reducing its dependence on energy exports revenues have not been particularly 
successful, keeping country's fate tied to the linkage between oil prices and its energy 
export revenues. A key element of Russia’s future strategy is to reduce economic 
dependence on energy from 30 % now to 18 % of GDP by 2030 (Energy Ministry of the 
Russian Federation, 2010). Russia's national strategy has till recently two goals: 
exploiting its energy resources as (i) a foreign policy tool and (ii) a “milking cow” 
                                                             
23The CIS is a regional organization formed during the dissolution of the Soviet Union, promoting 
coordinating powers between participating Member States regarding the trade, finance and 
security and cross-border crime prevention. At present the CIS consists of: Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan and Ukraine (the last two are Associate states). Georgia withdrew as a result of 
Russian-Georgian war in 2008, while the Baltic States refused to participate. 
24Lithuania and Poland have recently shown considerable progress in mitigating their dependency 
on Russian gas, opening on December 3, 2014, a floating regasification and storage unit (FRSU) 
at the port of Klaipėda and on October 12, 2015, an LNG terminal at Swinoujscie respectively. 
Both LNG facilities along with planned necessary interconnections (such as Gas Interconnection 
project between Poland and Lithuania and the Balticonnector project between Finland and 
Estonia) enable Lithuania, Poland and their neighbors to access alternatives to Russian gas and 
to successfully address their chronic energy vulnerability. They would not only prevent Russia 
from threatening potential gas disruptions of supply, but also deprive Kremlin’s opportunity to 
raise gas prices as a means of exerting political leverage (Roberts, 2016). 
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(Goodrich and Lanthermann, 2013). But the use of energy in serving geopolitical plans 
contrast its market goals. Global and regional circumstances have changed to the point 
that Kremlin has now to focus on defending its market share – establishing stable 
relations with traditional (Germany, Italy, Turkey) and new consumers (China, Japan, 
South Korea), to support its fragile economy, removing even temporarily energy weapon 
from its foreign policy arsenal. The 2030 target is to maintain a 10 % share of global oil 
trade and 20% of natural gas (Energy Ministry of the Russian Federation, 2010).The 
Kremlin has begun crafting a set of policies designed to adjust the country to the changes 
that will come in the next decades. It seems that Russia has understood that the new 
structure of the EU market (single, transparent - open market) is a competitive 
marketplace with increasing supply and interfuel competition. To succeed there, a 
supplier must adapt to the new reality. The time that EU wanted a strategic-political 
energy relationship with Russia has gone. EU has made now clear its intention to convert 
this relationship into an exclusive commercial one to the disappointment of the Kremlin’s 
energy agenda. On the other hand, as we will see below, examining the controversial 
Nord Stream II pipeline project, the traditionally good trading relationship between 
Germany and Russia is acting as “Trojan horse” against the EU Energy Union aims, 
showing that the Member States are not unified in a common energy policy, seeking to 
serve their national strategic interests. The unified Russian-German stance has been 
consistent throughout the controversy, defending this pipeline route as a “commercial 
project” which additional capacities “would result in a more enhanced EU energy 
security” (Adomeit, 2016). 
 
Russia is now addressing the very damaging uncertainty surrounding its relationship with 
key transit states such as Belarus and Ukraine. The construction of the Ust-Luga oil 
terminal on the Baltic Sea allows Russia to largely bypass the Belarusian pipeline system 
and ship crude and oil products directly to its big consumers. Similarly, the construction 
of the Nord Stream I gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea allows Russian gas to bypass 
both the Ukrainian and Belarusian transit systems. According to James Henderson and 
Tatiana Mitrova (2015) transit fees across Ukraine make that route “significantly more 
expensive” than Nord Stream I. However, Ukrainian transit remains essential for the 
Kremlin, at least until 2019 (estimated date of completion of Nord Stream II), when the 
current transit contract will expire (Buckley, 2016). By allowing Russia to guarantee 
deliveries to its major European customers, the bypass systems ensure Moscow's vital 
energy revenues (Goodrich and Lanthermann, 2013). Additionally, Gazprom’s plans to 
build Nord Stream II controversial pipeline project have caused serious concerns. 
Legally, there are doubts as to whether the project is fully compliant with EU regulations. 
21 
 
Although the Nord Stream II consortium consists of multiple international companies, 
there should be no illusions about the producer and the transporter of the gas running 
this route, namely Gazprom. Due to concerns regarding competition and energy security, 
the European Commission considers this an unwisely high concentration of supply from 
a single supplier along one transit route (De Jong, 2016). Moreover, the Members of the 
European Parliament (2016) stressed in a debate (Plenary session from 09.05.2016 to 
12.05.2016) with Climate Action and Energy Commissioner Miguel Arias Canete that this 
project would harm Energy Union’s core aim to promote diversification away from 
Russia, through investments in LNG terminals, interconnectors and reverse flow 
capacity. Moreover, calling Nord Stream II a “test of the European Energy Union,” the 
heads of governments of Baltic and central European countries signed and send a letter 
to the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, according to which 
they argued that Nord Stream II would weaken security of supply in central and southern 
Europe (Beckman, 2016). They fear that it would isolate their countries from liquid 
Western European gas markets and makes them more vulnerable to Russian price 
discrimination (Vorloeper, 2016). They also argued that the continued use of their gas 
transit systems by Russian gas would be in the interests both of their economies and of 
market competition (Jegelevicius, 2016). According to Agnia Grigas, PhD Non-resident 
Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, this project should not be perceived as a 
commercial and economically viable project (as Kremlin supports) but it serves 
geopolitical goals, taking into account the low gas prices, the demand in Europe (in 2015 
was approximately 20 percent lower than in 2005 - De Jong, 2016), the overcapacity in 
the global gas market and finally the continuing underuse of European gas import 
infrastructure (Nord Stream I has not been used at its full capacity) (Jegelevicius, 2016). 
On the other hand, the traditionally good strategic-commercial relationship between 
Russia and Germany is threatening gas market competition - undermining the objectives 
- spirit of the EU Energy Union as well as the finances of the gas transport businesses 
of countries (Ukraine, Poland, Belarus) between the two states (Powell, 2016).  
 
Russia has adjusted its energy strategy with European customers amid growing energy 
diversification and liberalization efforts. The Kremlin knows that its only hope of 
protecting gas revenues in the face of a potential global shale boom is to lock its 
customers into price-competitive, long-term contracts. (The American Interest, 2016). To 
keep its export volumes in a period of low demand and increasing competition, Kremlin 
has also to show more flexibility in its supply contracts by increasing the percentage of 
spot pricing (Zvonareva, 2015), providing a significant lower price benefit for end-
consumers comparing to oil-indexation pricing contracts. 
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Russia has decided to invest significant funds for the development of interconnections 
with growing energy markets of East Asia, seeking to diversify its portfolio of exports, 
expecting that the challenges in the European energy market will continue intensifying 
(Romanova, 2016). The development of eastern Siberia and the Far East are linked to 
the reorientation to Asia, aiming to provide a counterbalance to Europe and to western 
sanctions. But this is not without challenges. Kremlin is facing a tighter financial situation, 
due to price dynamics, western sanctions, and thus there are difficulties of financing new 
large-scale energy projects. Moreover, Asian energy demand is strongly affected by 
China’s undergoing economic slow-down (Romanova, 2016). 
 
Finally, according to the research team of Energy Institute of the Higher School of 
Economics & the Energy Research Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences 
(Zvonareva, 2015), the low European gas demand can lead to price competition between 
Russian gas and American LNG. Furthermore, in the case of low Asian demand, Middle 
Eastern gas will also flow to the EU and the price competition for Russia would be 
tougher. The analysts conclude that the price dumping would not help to Russia to “knock 
out” its competitors as it would cause a substantial loss of revenue. 
 
Although, the Kremlin’s energy strategy has managed to adjust Russia to the current and 
potential geopolitical challenges, addressing proactively the external shifts in energy 
consumption and production trends, but Russia's dependence on high oil prices causes 
legitimate questions about the long-term sustainability of the energy model of Russia. 
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4. Increasing reliance on imported hydrocarbons a threat for 
the EU energy security 
 
In the following section, there is a briefly analysis of the EU’s energy import dependency 
on third countries such as Russia, focusing on its high oil and gas import needs, which 
makes the EU vulnerable in case of potential supply disruptions and price volatility. The 
EU's energy import dependency gained an added dimension in the light of recent 
geopolitical events, i.e. the Ukrainian crisis. Temporary disruptions of gas supplies in the 
winters of 2006 and 2009 already provided a wake-up call for the EU, underlining the 
need of infrastructure development, increased cooperation-solidarity and of a unified 
European energy policy. Since then, the EU has done a lot to strengthen its energy 
security. However, the diversification progress is not as much as EU would prefer and 
thus further steps are needed. 
 
4.1. EU energy import dependency 
 
The energy import dependency of EU stood in 2015 at 53.4 % (see Figure 10). In 2015, 
the top-6 least dependent Member States were Estonia (8.9 %), Denmark (12.8 %) and 
Romania (17.0 %), followed by Poland (28.6 %), the Czech Republic (30.4 %), Sweden 
(32.0 %). On the other hand, the top-6 highest dependent states were Malta (97.7%), 
Luxembourg (96.6 %), Cyprus (93.4 %), Ireland (85.3 %), Belgium (80.1 %) and 
Lithuania (77.9 %) (Eurostat, 2016). 
 
 
Source: Eurostat (2016) 
 
Figure 10: Evolution of the EU energy import dependency: 1995-2015. 
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4.1.1. EU oil import dependency 
 
EU is the world’s largest oil-importing region and the second largest (13.9 % of world 
total consumption) -after the US- oil consuming market in the world (BP, 2016). 
Moreover, according to “Eurostat Energy Balances”, contrary to what many believe, the 
rate of EU dependence on oil imports (88 %) is much higher compared to its dependence 
on gas imports (70 %). Since 2000, the domestic oil demand has fallen (nearly 5 %) but 
crude oil extraction in the EU has fallen at a faster rate (nearly 58 %). The UK25 and 
Norway are Europe’s two significant oil producers, extracting oil from the North Sea, but 
their production is progressively declining. To be more specific, UK output fell from 2.6 
million barrel per day (mbd) to 0.9 mbd between 2000 and 2015 (nearly 34.6 %) while in 
Norway it fell from 3.3 mbd to 1.9 mbd during that period (nearly 57.5 %). Norway’s 
output is not counted as EU production, but the drop in UK output has led to a fall in the 
EU’s total output from 3.5 mbd to 1.5 mbd (historical low) between 2000 and 2015, 
representing a drop of nearly 43 % (BP, 2011 and 2016). This has led to an increased 
EU dependency on oil imports, which accounted for over 88 % of the EU’s total oil 
consumption in 2015, compared to 76 % in 2000, while oil dependency on Russian oil 
now accounted for 30 %, compared to 22 % in 2000 (see Figure 11). In 2015-a year of 
low oil prices-, the EU spends some €215 billion (bn) on crude oil and diesel imports, 
over 5 times as much as gas imports (€40 bn in the same year) (Cambridge 
Econometrics, 2016). 
 
 
Source: Eurostat Energy Balances 
 
Figure 11: EU oil import dependency. 
 
  
                                                             
25The result of a British referendum on 23 June 2016 was a majority in favour of the United 
Kingdom (UK) leaving the EU. Legally, the referendum was advisory rather than binding, and no 
formal process for leaving has been initiated yet. 
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4.1.2. EU gas import dependency  
 
Since 2000, the EU gas demand has fallen (nearly 8,7 %)26 but domestic gas production 
has fallen at a faster rate (nearly 48 %). The UK and Netherlands are contributing at 
most in EU gas production, but their domestic production is progressively declining. To 
be more specific, UK output fell from 108.4 billion cubic meters (bcm) to 39.7 bcm 
between 2000 and 2015 (nearly 63.3 %) while in Netherlands it fell from 58.1 bcm to 43 
bcm during that period (nearly 26 %) The drop in both countries’ domestic output has led 
to a fall in the EU’s total output from 231.9 to 120.1 bcm (historical low) between 2000 
and 2015, representing a drop of nearly 48 % (BP, 2011 and 2016). This has led to an 
increased EU dependency on gas imports, which accounted for over 70 % of the EU’s 
total oil consumption in 2015, compared to 47 % in 2000, while gas dependency on 
Russian gas accounted for 38.4 %, compared to 29.6 % in 2000 (see Figure 12). 
 
Source: Eurostat Energy Balances 
 
Figure 12: EU gas import dependency. 
 
4.1.3. Potential supply risk for the EU being based on geopolitical unstable source-
countries 
 
Russia is the biggest crude oil supplier, accounted for 30 % of EU imports in 2015 (see 
Figure 13). As in the oil sector, Russia is also the biggest gas supplier accounted for 38 
% of EU imports in the same year (see Figure 14). As we see below, the EU oil and gas 
demand-excluding Norway-are covered by regions which can be characterized as 
geopolitically unstable as they are experiencing either geopolitical tensions and terrorism 
or internal conflicts-war (see Table 12). As a result of the EU’s high reliance on gas and 
oil imports from such regions, EU energy market-economy are both highly exposed to 
the effects of potential supply shortages and oil price volatility (Bergamaschi, 2015). 
                                                             
26 The main factors led to falling demand are interfuel competition and economic instability, 
(Zvonareva, 2015). 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2000 2005 2010 2015
%bc
m
26 
 
Exposure to security of supply risk for oil and gas imports varies substantially across EU 
Member States. 
 
According to above mentioned Cambridge Econometrics’ report, the current risk of 
security of supply for crude oil is the highest for Poland and Hungary, which are reliant 
on one single supplier (Russia) for over 90 % of their supply of crude oil, while they are 
also reliant on Russia for 71 % and 100 % of their supply of gas respectively (BP, 2016). 
Furthermore, the sources of crude oil available to landlocked Eastern European 
members (such as Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary) cannot be diversified 
because these countries have no ports for oil tankers and so are completely reliant on 
Russian oil pipelines (this vulnerable situation stresses the vital need of developing LNG 
facilities in littoral states of Baltic, Adriatic and Black Sea linked with reverse-flow pipeline 
interconnections). The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 increased geopolitical 
instability in the East European region and raised concerns about the availability of 
Russian oil and gas supplies to these EU Member States. 
 
On the other hand, some EU Western Member States, such as Denmark and 
Netherlands, France can rely both on their domestic energy production, their large ports 
and their substantial gas storage capacity (see Table 13). These additional supply 
options provide flexibility to address potential disruption of energy supply from a single 
supplier-country.  
 
Source: Eurostat Energy Balances 
 
Figure 13: Main sources of EU crude oil imports: 2015. 
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Source: Eurostat Energy Balances 
 
Figure 14: Main sources of EU gas imports: 2015. 
 
 
 
Table 12: EU oil and gas geo-political unstable supplier-countries. 
 
Country Share % of EU imports… 
 
 Quantities- 
imported… Geopolitical Status-quo  …oil …gas  …oil 
(Mt) 
…gas 
(b ) 
Russia 30.4 38 
 
160.6 133.2 -Disturbed relations with the EU due to imposed sanctions following the annexation of Crimea 
Algeria 5 8.3 
 
26.4 30 -In the “Arab Spring” wake, there is still political instability-polarity and a high risk of terrorist attacks 
Angola 4 ---- 
 
21,1 ---- 
-Serious humanitarian crisis because of prolonged civil war 
-Depredation of the country’s rich mineral resources by 
authoritarian regime 
Azerbaijan 5 0.6 
 
26.4 0.16 
-Long-standing dispute over the Armenian-occupied 
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh is almost certain to spark a 
new war  
Nigeria 8 1.3 
 
42.2 4.7 -The terrorist group Boko Haram controls large territories of the country 
 
Saudi 
Arabia 8 ---- 
 
42.2 ---- -Neighbouring countries, such as Yemen, face particularly high risk of terrorism and conflict 
Iraq 7 ---- 
 
37 ---- -“Islamic State”, controls large territories of the country including many of the country’s oil fields 
Kazakhstan 6 ---- 
 
31.7 ---- 
-Geopolitical influence upon the region of Central Asia is 
already a field of conflict of interest between Russia and 
China. 
-Τhe “Crimean” case might be repeated 
 
Libya 3 1.8 
 
15.8 6.5 -In the "Arab Spring" wake, violent clashes continue to occur and there is still a high risk of terrorist attacks 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics (2016). Abbreviations: mt=million tons; bcm=billion cubic metres 
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Table 13: EU Gas storage capacity. 
 
Country Number of 
facilities 
Type Total 
capacity (mcm) 
Total peak output 
(mcm/day) 
Italy 10 -Depleted gas fields 16310 279.8 
Latvia 1 -Aquifer 2300 30 
Netherlands 8 -Depleted gas field 
-Salt cavern 
-LNG 
14369 339 
Poland 7 -Depleted gas field 
-Salt cavity 
2795 49 
Portugal 2 -Salt cavern 
-LNG 
476 23.2 
Romania 2 -Depleted gas field 2777 28 
Slovakia 1 -Depleted gas field 3156 45.1 
Spain 4 -Depleted gas/oil field 
-Aquifer 
2632 16.4 
Sweden 1 -Line rock cavern 9 0.9 
UK 10 -Depleted gas field 
-Salt cavern 
-LNG 
4620 174.8 
Source: EIA Gas Information (2016). Abbreviations: mcm=million cubic metres; mcm/day=million cubic metres per 
day 
 
4.2. The 2014 Russian-Ukrainian crisis’ implications for the EU's energy 
strategy 27 
The Ukrainian crisis has surely had a strong-negative impact on the EU’s energy 
security. To be more specific, gas supplies from Russia were particularly at risk, as more 
than 50 % of gas exported from Russia to the EU has to be transported through Ukraine, 
a country that has been de facto at war with Russia since Russia’s military intervention 
in Crimea. In addition to, the situation on the gas market got even worse due to the lack 
of agreement both on future supplies of gas between Russia and Ukraine and on the 
size of Ukraine’s gas debt to Russia. The lack of agreement on those issues caused 
Russia’s stopping gas supplies to Ukraine on 15 June 2014. At that time, there was also 
a real danger-fear that gas supplies to the EU could also be disrupted, as happened in 
the previous Russian–Ukrainian gas disputes in 2006 and 2009. In particular, there was 
a fear that six EU Member States that completely depended on Russia for their entire 
gas imports, namely Finland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania could be 
affected, with Slovakia28 and Bulgaria29 facing the most critical situation as they received 
                                                             
27 Please note that parts of this section are based on a written assignment (“EU-Russia 
Interdependence and Security of Energy Supply in Europe”) written by author within the 
framework of course “Energy Transport and Storage” by Professor Dr. Sandro Furlan. 
28 As a result of “Crimean crisis”, Slovakia has managed to diversify its supply of gas, reducing 
its dependency on Russian gas in 2015 at 29 % of its total supply compared to 100 % in 2013-
2014 (BP, 2016). 
29 According to Temenujka Petkova, the outgoing energy minister, Bulgaria and its EU partners 
have absorbed the lesson of the 2009 crisis. As she stated: “We’ve worked in a focused way to 
avert a similar situation by going for diversification of routes and sources of supply. Our actions 
are within an overall EU energy policy framework. There’s no way we’ll reach a 2009-type 
situation again”. To diversify its energy supply, Bulgaria and its EU partners have planned to 
construct new cross-border pipeline routes. The most important among them is that of the gas 
“Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria” (ICGB). It will deliver 1 bcm of gas from the “Shah Deniz 2” field 
29 
 
all their Russian gas through Ukraine. In January of 2009; Russia tried to settle a 
payment dispute with Ukraine, its main transit country, by turning off the gas flow. During 
the gas disruption, Bulgaria's reserves ran out, Slovakia was forced to declare a state of 
emergency. For the EU, it was a shock to see how vulnerable new Member States, 
liberated in 1989 from Soviet political control, were to a Russian gas embargo. 
Unboundedly, the Russian-Ukrainian crisis that broke out in February 2014 has lifted the 
issue of energy security higher on the EU political agenda. The proposal to create an EU 
Energy Union was first made by the president of the European Council Donald Tusk in 
April 2014. This, he argued, would prevent “Russia’s energy stranglehold” on Europe 
(Siddi, 2016). In response to the Russian annexation of Crimea, the “European Energy 
Security Strategy” launched in May 2014, which aims to ensure a stable and abundant 
supply of energy for European citizens and the economy. As part of the Strategy, 38 
European countries, including all EU countries, carried out energy security stress tests 
in 2014. The tests showed that a prolonged supply disruption would have a substantial 
impact on the EU’s security of supply. In particular, Eastern EU countries would be 
strongly affected. Based on the analysis of the stress tests, a number of short-term 
measures were adopted in preparation of the 2014-2015 Winter. The Strategy also 
addresses long-term security of supply challenges. It proposes actions in five key areas: 
(i) increasing energy efficiency (by at least 27 %) and reaching the proposed 2030 energy 
and climate goals, (ii) increasing domestic energy production and diversifying sources 
and routes, reversing energy flows if necessary, (iii) completing the establishment of a 
fully integrated-liberalized internal energy market and building missing infrastructure 
interconnectors to rapidly respond to supply disruptions, (iv) adopting a unified EU 
external energy policy (“negotiate with one voice vis-à-vis” third countries such as 
Russia), (v) strengthening emergency response and solidarity mechanisms, (vi) 
decarbonize the economy (to achieve a target of 40 % emissions reduction by 2040) -
become a global leader in clean-green energy technologies.30 Moreover, In February 
2015, the European Commission published the “Energy Union package” which aims to 
pave the way for the creation of an integrated European energy market, where Member 
States cooperate to strengthen their energy security, decarbonize their economy by 
making their energy sectors’ more climate-friendly, and decreasing its reliance on 
external energy suppliers such as Russia (Siddi, 2016). Following, the European 
                                                             
in the Caspian and it will be completed by late 2018 or early 2019. Moreover, domestic oil 
exploration-production can also add another dimension to the efforts of Bulgaria for energy 
diversification (Black Sea shelf) (Barber, 2016). 
30 Low carbon transport policy and other policy measures to reduce domestic oil consumption will 
contribute in achieving these targets. 
30 
 
Commission announced a series of proposals for its gas and electricity markets in 2016 
and 2017, among which was the “Sustainable Energy Security Package”, published in 
February 2016, consists of four proposals. To be more specific, two of them have a 
legislative nature, namely a Regulation for Security of Gas Supply (Regulation) and a 
Decision on Intergovernmental Agreements on energy (Decision). Regarding the 
Regulation, the Commission proposes a shift from national approach to a regional 
approach when designing security of supply measures, introducing a solidarity principle 
among Member States to ensure the supply of households and essential social services 
in case of a potential severe supply crisis. Regarding the Decision, it introduces an ex-
ante assessment-binding on Member States - of compatibility of intergovernmental 
agreements between them and third countries with the EU competition rules and internal 
energy market legislation. At this point, we should also refer on EU council’s recent 
meeting’s outcomes regarding the security of supply issues, took place on 5th December 
of 2016, where the Council agreed that long-term gas contracts providing 40 % or more 
of annual gas consumption in any member state will be notified to the competent 
authority (European Council, 2016). This decision (along with Europeans Commission’s 
antitrust inquiry of Gazprom) will primarily affect eastern European countries, where 
Russian giant Gazprom remains the dominant supplier. On the other hand, the two non-
legislative proposals are strategy papers dealing respectively with LNG and Gas Storage 
(improve access of all Member States to LNG by investing in the construction of the 
necessary infrastructure), and Heating and Cooling (focuses on removing barriers to 
decarbonisation in buildings and industry) (European Commission, 2016). 
 
4.2.1. Diversification of energy transport routes 
 
The EU has planned a number of new gas pipelines as part of the so-called "Southern 
Energy Corridor” in order to diversify its energy transport routes. These pipelines are 
supposed to supply the EU with gas from the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Central 
Asia. A number of transport routes are included in this energy project such as the Trans-
Adriatic gas pipeline (TAP), a pipeline connecting Turkey, Greece and Italy (ITGI), a 
pipeline connecting Azerbaijan, Georgia and Romania (AGRI), the Trans-Caspian gas 
pipeline and the South-Eastern European Pipeline (SEEP). Currently, the most 
promising project is the TANAP pipeline (Trans-Anatolia Gas Pipeline). This pipeline 
would start at the border of Georgia and Turkey and deliver gas to the border of Turkey 
and Bulgaria.  
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However, the flagship project of the “Southern Energy Corridor” was the “Nabucco” 
pipeline, a joint European and American project aimed at undermining Russian influence 
over the European continent, reducing Russian energy imports by supplying Central 
Europe from Caspian Sea with 31 bcm of gas annually. It has been aborted (2013) due 
to a combination of geopolitical factors and business considerations, showing that EU is 
not unified in terms of a common energy strategy (Weiss, 2013). 
 
The European Union's policy to diversify transport routes would endanger Russia’s 
position as the largest exporter of oil and gas to the EU. Looking beyond the economic 
losses regarding Russia’s revenues deriving from the transit of oil and gas to the 
European market. In the case of a successful implementation of the mentioned EU 
projects, Russia’s vulnerability would be enhanced due to a partial reduction of its 
geopolitical influence in vital areas of its interest (Putin’s version of “Lebensraum”)31 such 
as former-Soviet states.  
 
 
4.2.2. Diversification of supplier source-countries 
 
The diversification of the EU’s energy supply and the reduction of its dependence on 
Russian energy commodities lie in the core of EU energy agenda. To achieve that, EU 
will require exploiting alternative-third countries’ sources of energy to enhance its 
security of energy supply. This may include increasing LNG imports from Algeria, Qatar 
or Nigeria, increasing gas imports from Norway and exploring the possibility to import 
shale fuels from the USA. In my opinion-based on the above geopolitical analysis- 
strengthening EU energy security on a long term strategy will not be achieved by being 
based largely on energy imports from geo-political unstable regions such as Africa and 
Middle East. On the other hand, regarding the potential benefits from exploiting US LNG 
as an alternative source of supply, some analysts predict that its arrival in European gas 
markets could spark a price war, leading to lower prices for consumers that could boost 
the European economy. Surely, Russian pipeline gas can be cheaper than US LNG, 
                                                             
31The concept of “Lebensraum” (“living space”) refers to the German-Reactionary modernism 
ideology (for more information, see Jeffrey Herf ’s book “Reactionary Modernism: Technology, 
Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich”,1984) expressing expansionist ideas from 
the 1890s to the 1940, according to which Germany "entitled" to conquer the territories of 
neighbouring countries to secure German people’s prosperity The most extreme form of this 
ideology was supported by Hitler’s Nazi Party in the Third Reich against neigbouring countries 
such as Austria, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Pro rata, from my point of view, the annexation of 
Crimea seems as an provocative attempt of Putin to establish a “Lebensraum” for Russia near its 
western borders. 
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because that type of gas has to be liquefied, shipped and regasified at arrival. But many 
in Europe see the U.S. LNG entry into the market as part of a broader geopolitical effort 
to challenge Russian domination of energy supplies and prices. “The new LNG will put 
downward pressure on prices, and losing both volume and value could be a hard pill to 
swallow for Russia”, said Trevor Sikorski of London-based consultancy Energy Aspects 
(Wall Street Journal, 2016) When Lithuania opened its “FSRU Independence” LNG 
import terminal at the end of 2014, Gazprom’s answer was a gas price discount to 
Lithuania. “We have such low production costs that we will always be able to cut the 
selling price by a dollar or two when it comes to fighting off a rival”, said a senior source 
at Gazprom (Reuters, 2016b). Although an aggressive policy aiming to maintain its ΕU 
market share by discounting its prices would hurt the Gazprom's margins, at the same 
time it would make unprofitable for US supplies to cross the Atlantic. Russia is ready to 
protect its market share by discounting its prices and reworking its long-term take-or-pay 
contracts whose linkages to oil prices have long been points of contention in Europe. 
Before the appearance of US LNG and the threat posed for Russian economic and 
geopolitical interest by its arrival in the European gas market, Europe’s heavy reliance 
on Russian gas supplies meant it had to accept its onerous terms. Thanks to a quickly 
growing global LNG market mainly due to US shale gas boom, it has more leverage at 
the negotiating table. Undoubtedly, potential volumes of LNG from the United States 
would benefit the EU energy markets offering a new supplier to EU consumers, by 
diversifying its sources of supply. For Eastern part of Europe, especially the Baltic region 
and Poland where the United States enjoys strong and friendly-diplomatic relations, any 
decision to export US LNG to that region would be welcomed as a potential offset to their 
dependence on Russian gas (The American Interest, 2015). 
 
4.2.3. Diversification of energy types 
 
Realistically, a total diversification away from gas or oil during this century is not possible. 
Even if revolutionary new energy technologies are discovered, the infrastructure to 
deliver those energies to industrial and domestic consumers would have to be built. 
Moreover, given the assumption that these energy commodities will be readily available 
for several generations, some valid decisions still can be made now as to how most 
wisely use the resource in the longer term and how to diversify away from its use.  
 
For Europe, the diversification away from its use should consist broadly of finding 
alternate means of electric power generation. To diversify its energy used types, EU has 
decided to become a leader in the diffusion of Renewable Energy Sources (RES). The 
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EU’s binding commitment to reaching 20 % renewables by 2020 as part of its energy mix 
is a wise decision that will help to not only reduce emissions, but also stimulate 
alternatives to gas for power production. In this regard, the EU is on the right track to 
reduce its dependence on external hydrocarbon suppliers, such as Russia. To achieve 
that, EU’ first priority is the creation of a better transmission grid for integrating existing 
and new types of RES32 into the electricity network. This would provide an incentive for 
further investments, increase network security-efficiency and enable consumers to better 
control33 their energy use. With oil and gas prices decreasing, this would provide a 
perfect opportunity for EU Member States to raise taxes on both, and use the extra 
revenue to support the transition into a greener, more self-sufficient energy system.  
 
To conclude, EU’s renewable and biofuel commitments will be extremely useful, not only 
for saving the environment, but also from the perspective of reducing Russian gas 
dependency. The EU’s solidarity to the commitment is crucial and an area to look to 
promote is investment within the newer EU counties to insure these targets are met. In 
particular, investment in alternate electric power production in countries such as Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic states is a far wiser choice for EU 
than investing in additional pipelines to Russia. 
 
 
5. Recommendations for a long-term EU energy strategy 
 
Undoubtedly, the EU should take specific actions to mitigate its dependency on Russian 
hydrocarbons in order to enhance its energy security. A multidimensional approach for 
doing so would include: (i) Diversification of supply based on the domestic exploitation 
of “taboo sources” such as shale resources and nuclear energy, (ii) Diversification of 
sources through LNG, investing in the construction of new gas interconnectors linked 
with new regasification facilities, focusing on the littoral EU Member States located in the 
Baltic, Adriatic and Black Sea. 
 
 
                                                             
32 Power-to-gas technology can transform excess electricity from wind or solar sources into 
synthetic gas, storable or transported in the gas system, helping to address periods when 
electricity from variable renewable sources is scarce and power prices high (Smedley, 2016). 
33 Denmark’s smart grid should be the future for managing electricity consumption. (Danish 
Energy Association, 2011) 
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5.1 Domestic production options based on the exploitation of “taboo” sources 
 
To decrease its import dependency, EU must - amid other policy options-increase its 
domestic energy production. At this point, we should refer that the EU’s conventional (oil 
and gas) proved reserves have been significantly declined round 32,5 % and 64 % 
respectively since 1995. They are now estimated to be round 5.6 thousand million barrels 
of oil and 1.3 trillion cubic metres of gas (BP, 2016). Taking into account the above 
situation, EU must examine the possibility of including - in its long-term energy strategy 
- the unconventional fossil fuels and nuclear energy, since their exploitation would boost 
up domestic energy production and hence enhance its energy security in long term. The 
Conclusions of the European Council on the Energy Union, held on 19 March 2015 
emphasize the need to strengthen the security of gas supplies - including exploitation of 
indigenous resources, which can be read as encompassing shale gas extraction 
(European Council, 2015). 
 
5.1.1 Unconventional fossil fuel (shale) resources 
 
The high petroleum price of recent times has prompted governments around the world 
to re-examine their energy supplies and to consider national security issues. Whereas at 
one time an indigenous energy resource such as shale fossil fuels would have been left 
undeveloped, there are now becoming attractive to more and more countries and 
feasible to further Research & Development (R&D) programmes. The success story of 
shale gas boom in North America has urged European countries to examine the 
productive possibilities of their own rich shales. Unproved technically recoverable ΕU 
shale oil reserves are estimated to be round 13.2 billion barrels (bb) (see Figure 15) while 
EU shale gas reserves are estimated to be round 445 trillion cubic feet (tcf) (see Figure 
16). 
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Sources: US Energy Information Administration (2015) based on world shale resource assessments 
 
Figure 15: EU unproved technically recoverable shale oil reserves by country. 
 
 
 
Sources: US Energy Information Administration (2015) based on world shale resource assessments 
 
Figure 16: EU unproved technically recoverable shale gas reserves by country. 
 
A 2012 report from the European Commission (“Unconventional Gas: Potential Market 
Impacts in the European Union”) states that, unlike the United States, “Shale gas 
production will not make Europe self-sufficient in gas. The best-case scenario for shale 
gas development in Europe is one in which declining conventional production can be 
replaced and import dependence maintained at a level of around 60%”. In November 
2012, a divided European Parliament approved committee reports which recommended 
that policy on developing shale gas should be set by each member country for itself, 
rather than by the European Parliament (BBC, 2012). This was done despite intense 
lobbying by Gazprom for an EU-wide ban on hydraulic fracturing, perceived the potential 
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EU domestic shale development as a threat for both economic interests and geopolitical 
plans of Russia. At this point, we should also make a reference to the Former NATO 
Secretary-General Anders Rasmussen’ statement accusing Russia of supporting 
environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that oppose the development 
of shale gas (The Guardian, 2014). Member States with shale gas resources have taken 
very different approaches. While some countries, such as Poland and the UK, are 
enthusiastic about shale gas development, others such as France, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria had bans or moratoriums in place against 
hydraulic fracturing. Moreover, public opinion on shale gas is divided, and varies greatly 
between Member States. On one hand, proponents argue that the risks are manageable 
and point to long-term economic benefits and reduced energy dependence from third 
countries such as Russia. On the other hand, opponents are concerned mainly about 
environmental impacts on water use and air (pollution), earthquakes, disruption of natural 
habitats, as well as disturbance of local communities by truck traffic and drilling noise 
(externalities). Addressing these environmental and social concerns is considered to be 
critical for the successful development of shale gas.  
 
The opposing countries to the exploitation of shale resources should re-examine in the 
near future the possibility of exploiting these resources, as the development of -
environmental friendly- mining techniques in the coming years will contribute to mitigating 
the environmental and social concerns within these countries. A long-term EU energy 
strategy should include the exploitation of shale resources, as it will significantly 
contribute to the enhancement of its energy security- reducing or at least keeping steady 
its import dependency- by increasing EU historic-low domestic energy production. This 
would keep oil and gas prices low for consumers challenging Russian domination of 
energy supplies and prices. Furthermore, shale-rich Eastern European Member States 
would better defend themselves against Kremlin’s coercive pipeline politics, enhancing 
both their energy security and their national sovereignty. Moreover, the potential EU 
shale development will contribute to the stimulation of its recessionary economy by 
attracting large-scale and capital-intensive energy investments, which could contribute 
to the EU's return to economic growth with corresponding social benefits. Fracking 
industry has already generated thousands of jobs in recent past and is expected to 
generate plenty of jobs in near future. 
 
Concluding, EU must first be integrated into issues of a long-term energy policy-strategy 
and then define a common clear-transparent legal framework for the development of 
shale resources, which will both aim to protect the environment and local communities 
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but on the other hand will speed up bureaucratic procedures relating to the shale 
investments. 
 
5.1.2. Nuclear Energy 
 
There is no coherent strategy on nuclear power in EU. Several important countries such 
as Italy and Austria do not have nuclear in their energy mix, while some countries 
(Germany by 2022, Belgium by 2025, Spain in 2028, and Switzerland in 2035) have 
decided to phase out nuclear. On the other hand, several countries have expressed 
interest in building new reactors (for instance the Netherlands, and Sweden) or in 
introducing nuclear in their mix (Poland, Turkey). However, it would be optimistic to see 
any substantial increase in nuclear power production in Europe post 2020, mostly 
because of high costs, but also due to phase-out decisions.  
 
According to Maehlum (2013) nuclear energy is considered as one of the most 
environmentally friendly source of energy as it produces fewer greenhouse gas 
emissions during the production of electricity as compared to traditional sources like coal 
power plants. Also, even though the expense of setting up nuclear power plants is 
moderately high, the expense of operating them is quite low. Moreover, as solar and 
wind energy are dependent upon weather conditions, nuclear power plant has no such 
constraints and can run without disruption in any climatic condition. Finally, the amount 
of fuel required by nuclear power plant is comparatively less than what is required by 
other power plants as energy released by nuclear fission is approximately ten million 
times greater than the amount of energy released by fossil fuel atom. 
 
On the other hand, radiation isn’t easily dealt with, especially in nuclear waste and 
maintenance materials, and expensive solutions are needed to shield both people and 
the environment from its harm. Moreover, there is also fear of experiencing tremendous 
disaster as in the case of “The Chernobyl accident”, the worst nuclear accident in the 
history. Its harmful effects on humans and ecology can still be seen today. More recently 
there was another accident that happened in Fukushima in Japan, causing serious 
environmental concerns.  
 
To conclude, EU should examine the possibility of integrating nuclear development in its 
long term energy strategy, gaining benefits from nuclear rewards but at the same time 
taking all such preventive measures to mitigate its risks. Nuclear energy can be an 
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effective and stable energy option, contributing to enhancing energy security. For this 
reason, it should not be discarded as an option in advance. 
 
5.2. The development of new gas pipelines and LNG regasification facilities 
 
The European Commission seems to focus mainly on improving its regulatory 
framework. Yet the lack of physical interconnection necessarily limits market integration. 
To this dilemma, the Commission has to either examine if new infrastructure is required, 
or focusing on “debottlenecking”34 existing infrastructure. There are increasing prospects 
that European consumers will benefit as the market enters a low-price era amidst 
competition between Russian, Norwegian, Qatari and US LNG. To improve the access 
of all Member States to LNG, the EU needs to develop the necessary infrastructure 
(upgrading existing or constructing new interconnections linked with new LNG 
regasification facilities) and simultaneously complete the internal market, allowing all 
Member States to access international LNG markets, either directly or via other Member 
States. The EU's overall LNG import capacity is significant enough to meet around 43 % 
of total current gas demand (Gas Information, 2016). The EU should fund infrastructure 
investments connecting its highly liquid-competitive north-western gas market – which 
can have access to several sources of gas including a number of terminals with 
substantial capacity to import LNG (see Table 14) – with southern and eastern market 
where suppliers are few and Member States are heavily dependent on a single gas 
supplier (Russia), and would therefore be hardest hit in a potential supply crisis (Εwi 
ER&S and EUCERS, 2016). Particularly, the littoral countries of Adriatic, Baltic and Black 
Sea do need LNG regasification facilities in order to make sure that both they can have 
access to a regional gas hub with a diverse range of supply sources, including LNG, and 
that the Central European landlocked countries would also take advantage of that 
reverse-flow liquidity. Based on the list of EU “projects of common interest”, the LNG 
strategy includes a list of key infrastructure projects which are essential for ensuring that 
all Member States of the EU can benefit from LNG (European Commission, 2013). 
  
                                                             
34 “Debottlenecking” is the process of identifying specific areas and/or equipment in oil and gas 
facilities that limit the flow of product (otherwise known as bottlenecks) and optimizing them so 
that overall capacity in the plant can be increased (Audubon Companies, 2014). 
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Table 14: EU LNG import facilities. 
 
  Regasification Storage 
Country Numb. of LNG Terminals 
Nominal capacity 
(bcm per year of 
gas) 
Total numb. 
of 
Vaporizers 
Total capacity 
(tcm of LNG) 
Total Numb. 
of Tanks 
Belgium 1 9.5 12 380 4 
France 3 22.5 21 840 9 
Greece 1 5.2 6 130 2 
Italy 3 15.9 12 488 8 
Lithuania 1 4.2 4 173 -- 
Netherlands 1 12.7 8 540 3 
Portugal 
Poland 
1 
1 
8.0 
5.0 
7 
-- 
390 
160 
3 
2 
Spain 6 63.4 43 3317 25 
UK 4 56.5 35 2233 15 
Source: EIA Gas Information (2016). Abbreviations: numb. =number, bcm=billion cubic metres, tcm=thousand cubic 
metres, LNG=Liquefied Natural Gas 
6. Conclusion 
 
The energy relations between EU and Russia could be described as an asymmetrical 
interdependence between them. This balance is particularly sensitive for both of them. 
From EU’s perspective, the over-dependency on Russian energy commodities is 
threatening both its energy security and its ex-Soviet Member States’ sovereignty as the 
latter are vulnerable to the Kremlin’s potential economic-political leverage. From 
Russia’s perspective, its economy’s viability and hence its state’s stability-cohesion is 
threatened by EU’s energy liberalization and diversification attempts, along with growing 
global LNG industry, which are challenging Russia’s dominance in the European energy 
market. Undoubtedly, there are conflicting geopolitical-economic interests and goals of 
both actors’ strategy which shifted EU-Russia’s relationship from a strategic-political 
relationship to a simplified commercial relationship. 
 
Therefore EU needs to establish a common-unified EU energy policy, negotiating with 
one voice vis-à-vis Russia. Adopting a scheme for voluntary common purchasing of gas 
from Russia would be a first step in this direction. The EU should be in control of Russia’s 
influence over its energy market. It should not be forgotten that Russia needs the EU, 
and not only for gas and oil revenues. With (i) demand decreasing in the short-term, (ii) 
Russia’s position as a reliable partner-supplier questionable and (iii) the Russian 
economy in tatters, it is not unlikely to see Russia in the near future to take the right path 
of action in carrying out needed reforms internally and stopping aggression outside its 
borders. To conclude, the political will of the Member States to coordinate their energy 
policies and the availability of sufficient funds to implement infrastructure projects will be 
the key determinants of a successful Energy Union. On the other hand, if Member States 
precede their national-strategic interests against common aims, as in the case of 
Germany with the controversial project of Nord Stream II, then EU Energy Union would 
develop into a failure.  
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Appendix  
 
Table A1: Russia’s major oil pipelines. 
 
Facility Status Capacity  (mbd) 
Length  
(miles) 
Diameter 
(inches) Market/Destination 
Baku-Novorossiysk Operating 0.1 830 21 Novorossiysk port on the Black Sea 
Baltic Pipeline System I Operating 1.3 730 28-40 Primorsk port in the Gulf of Finland 
Baltic Pipeline System II Operating 0.6 620 40-42 Ust-Luga port on the Gulf of Finland 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium Operating 0.7 (planned phased expansion to 1.3) 940 40-42 Novorossiysk Port 
Druzhba Operating 1.2-1.4 3957 17- 40 Europe 
Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) Operating 
ESPO-1—1.2 currently, 1.6 by 2020 
ESPO-2—0.5 currently, 1.0 by 2020 
Daqing spur—0.3 currently, 0.6 by 2018 
ESPO-1-1713 
ESPO-2-1300 
Daqing spur: 656 
ESPO-1-42-48 
ESPO-2-42-40 
Daqing spur-28 
Kozmino port with a spur 
to Daqing-China 
Kuyumba-Taishet Operating 0.16 440 21-28 Asia-Pacific region via the (ESPO) pipeline 
Purpe-Samotlor Operating 0.5 270  Asia-Pacific region via the (ESPO) pipeline 
Zapolyarye-Purpe Commissioning 0.6 (expandable to 0.9) 300 40 Asia-Pacific region via the ESPO pipeline 
Source: US Energy Information Administration (2016). Abbreviation: mbd=million barrel per day 
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Table A2: Russia’s major gas pipelines. 
 
 
Facility Status Annual Design Capacity (bcm) 
Onshore 
Section 
(miles) 
Offshore 
Section 
(miles) 
Diameter 
(inches) 
Operat 
Press. 
(atm.bars) 
Compressor 
Stations 
Markets/ 
Destination 
Blue Stream Operating 16 232 246 
Mainland: 55 
Mountain.: 47 
Submarine: 24 
250 (3) Main station- “Beregovaya”:150 Mw cap. Turkey via the Black Sea 
Dzhubga-Sochi Operating 3.8 17.5 159.5 20R 98 (6) Russia 
Gryazovets-Vyborg Operating 55 570 0 55 100 (6) Main station “Portovaya”: 366 Mw 
Russia’s Northwest 
region 
Minsk-Vilnius–Kaunas-
Kaliningrad Operating 2.5 91  
Pip.1:19.7 
Pip.2:27.5 54 
(6) Μain station “Jauniunai”: 
34.5 Mw Belarus & Lithuania 
Nord Stream Operating 55 1.24 759 48 220 (1)“Portovaya”:366 Mw Germany & Northern Europe via the Baltic Sea 
Northern Tyumen 
Regions (SRTO)–
Torzhok 
Operating 
varies between 20.5 -
28.5 bcm at various 
sections 
1367 44 Above ground:56 Submerged:47 120 (13)968 Mw aggr.cap. Western Russia & Europe 
Sakhalin-Khabarovsk -
Vladivostok Operating 30 1118  48 100 
(14) “Sakhalin” main station: 
32Mw cap. 
Eastern Russia /potent 
exports to Asia via LNG 
South Corridor Pipelines Under construction 63 1557  32 284.5 (10) 1516Mw aggr. cap. 
Europe via Turkish 
Stream 
Turkish Stream Planning 63 112 560 32 277.4 (4) Main station: “Russkaya”: 448 MW 
Turkey- Southeast 
Europe via the Black Sea 
Pochinki-Gryazovets Operating 36 404  56 74 (6) 580 Mw aggr cap. Russian Northwest and Central regions 
Power of Siberia Under construction 38 1864  56 98 (8) China 
Yamal Europe Operating 33 2607  56 84 (31) 2399 Mw aggr.cap. Poland, Germany & Europe 
Source: US Energy Information Administration (2016). Abbreviations: aggr.cap. =aggregate capacity; atm.bars=atmospheric bars; bcm=billion cubic meters; Mw=Megawatt; Pip. = pipelines 
